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Abstract
What is the effect of product market integration on the market equilibrium in the presence of
international network externalities in consumption? To address this question, we set up a
spatial two-country model and we find that the economic forces at work may have an
ambiguous effect on prices.
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European integration and its economic implications constitute important and de-
bated issues. In the general literature, product market integration has been inter-
preted as a reduction in costs associated with international trade (e.g., transport
costs, tari⁄s, information costs about foreign markets, etc.). More integrated prod-
uct markets would reduce ￿rms￿power and make markets more competitive. As it
is widely recognized, and remarked in a recent speech by Jean-Claude Trichet, Pres-
ident of the ECB, ￿economic integration bene￿ts consumers through lower prices"
(Berlin, 13 June 2007).1 In this short note, we show that once one takes into account
goods characterized by ￿international" network externalities, this need not be the
case.
International network externalities arise when consumer￿ s utility increases with
the number of consumers adopting the same good or compatible goods regardless of
whether they live in their own country or abroad.2 Indeed, market integration a⁄ects
not only ￿traditional" trade barriers but also less visible non-tari⁄ barriers, such as
the proportion of foreign network that consumers of one country can enjoy. Namely,
international network externalities can be partial because of trade policy reasons
(where international standardization constitutes a key instrument),3 or because of
technical reasons linked to the good of interest.
Accordingly, we address the following question: what is the e⁄ect of product
market integration on the market equilibrium in the presence of international net-
work externalities in consumption? We set up a spatial two-country model with two
network goods (one per country) and consumers with heterogenous preferences for
the local (foreign) good. We ￿nd that the economic forces at work may have an
ambiguous e⁄ect on prices.
As far as we know, there are a few studies about international trade in the pres-
ence of consumption externalities. Janeba (2007) studies the bene￿ts from free trade
in the context of consumption externalities via a general equilibrium two country-
model with perfectly competitive markets. Iwasa and Kikuchi (2007) develop a
1http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2007/html/sp070613.en.html.
2There is a substantial amount of literature on network externalities. The seminal paper is
Katz and Shapiro (1985).
3Gandal and Shy (2001) study governments￿incentives to recognize foreign standards in the
presence of network e⁄ects and conversion costs.
1two-country model with incompatible country-speci￿c hardware technologies which
is an extension of Gandal and Shy (1992) closed-economy model. In particular, they
study the software provision decision of software ￿rms to hardware ￿rms. Their
work thus deals with ￿rms￿strategies towards vertically related ￿rms, whereas we
focus on horizontal competitors.
2 Model
As far as the supply side is concerned, suppose that ￿rm A, installed in country
1, produces network good A and charges price pA; ￿rm B, installed in country 2,
produces network good B and charges price pB. These two network goods are com-
patible, that is consumers adopting good A bene￿t from the number of consumers
buying good A as well as from the number of consumers buying good B. Never-
theless, the network e⁄ect coming from consumers living abroad is only partial as
long as markets are not fully integrated. Product market integration implies cost
reductions that we model via an increase in the network e⁄ect. As an example, we
think of mobile communication services. A network operator providing this kind of
service usually allows you to communicate with both consumers adopting the same
operator and consumers adopting a rival operator regardless of where the consumers
live. In other words, we can say that these services are compatible. However, living
in one country and communicating with people abroad via a mobile phone is far
more expensive than calling people in the same country. The network operator,
through roaming agreements which allow it to use the foreign network, can provide
its customers abroad with the service. Thanks to market integration, these costs are
progressively decreasing. For example, in the European Union, the Regulation on
roaming charges within the European Union which is in force since June 30, 2007, is
forcing service providers to lower their roaming fees across the 27-member bloc. The
new tari⁄s will be applied by September 30, 2007. Moreover, it has been planned
that these ￿Eurotari⁄s" will gradually decrease over the next three years.4
As for the demand side, we assume that each country has a continuum of con-
sumers of mass n indexed by x which are uniformly distributed along the interval
[0;1]. Each consumer has a unit demand and can buy either good A or good B.
In a standard way, the utility coming from consumption depends on the intrinsic
4http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/activities/roaming/roaming_regulation/index_en.htm.
2bene￿t of the good, on the network e⁄ect, on the price and on some trade costs to
buy the foreign good. Consumers di⁄er in their valuation of the intrinsic bene￿t as
well as in their valuation of the network bene￿t. In particular, consumers which are
￿foreign brand-oriented￿value little the (intrinsic and network) bene￿t from buying
the local good and viceversa consumers which are ￿local brand-oriented￿value little
the (intrinsic and network) bene￿t from buying the foreign good. We also assume
that the degree of product market integration between the two countries a⁄ects con-
sumers￿utility in three ways: through the intrinsic bene￿t, the network bene￿t as
well as through the trade costs. Namely, let n1 and n2 denote the number of buyers
(of either good) in country 1 and 2, respectively. Obviously, ni ￿ n, for i = 1;2. A
consumer buys at most one good and purchases either one or no unit of any given
good. De￿ne ￿ ￿ 0 our inverse measure of product market integration: as ￿ ap-
proaches zero markets become more integrated. The utility of consumer x 2 [0;1]






u ￿ c(￿)x + ￿ (n1 + ￿ (￿)n2)(1 ￿ x) ￿ pA if he buys good A;
u ￿ c(￿)(1 ￿ x) + ￿ (n1 + ￿ (￿)n2)x ￿ t(￿) ￿ pB if he buys good B;
0 if he buys nothing.






u ￿ c(￿)x + ￿ (n2 + ￿ (￿)n1)(1 ￿ x) ￿ pB if he buys good B;
u ￿ c(￿)(1 ￿ x) + ￿ (n2 + ￿ (￿)n1)x ￿ t(￿) ￿ pA if he buys good A;
0 if he buys nothing.
Thus, x 2 [0;1] measures the consumer￿ s valuation of the foreign good. A high con-
sumer type (x ! 1) is ￿foreign brand-oriented￿ ; on the other hand, a low consumer
type (x ! 0) is ￿local brand-oriented￿ . Notice that indeed consumers living closer
the border may prefer a foreign good since they are likely to have more connections
with foreign residents.5
As far as the intrinsic bene￿t is concerned, a consumer living in country 1 (in
country 2) has a utility of u ￿ c(￿)x, if he buys the good A (B) produced in his
country, and a utility of u ￿c(￿)(1 ￿ x), if he buys the good B (or A) produced in
the other country. The intrinsic bene￿t increases with product market integration
(i.e., c0 (￿) > 0): the more the two countries are integrated, the higher the quality
5Think of people living in Trentino (an Italian region located in the extreme north) versus
people living in Sicily (extreme south).
3of mobile phones because of a higher mobility of high skilled workers (experts in
the ￿eld).6 In order to purchase the foreign good, a consumer has to bear the
additional cost t(￿) which is a function of the degree of product market integration
and represents the level of administrative costs for buying abroad. We posit t(￿) ￿ 0
and t0 (￿) ￿ 0.
As for the network bene￿t, a consumer living in country i = f1;2g and buying
good l = fA;Bg has a utility of ￿ (ni + nj￿ (￿))(1 ￿ x), if he buys the local good
l, and a utility of ￿ (ni + ￿ (￿)nj)x, if he buys the foreign good (with j 6= i and
j = f1;2g). ￿ (￿) 2 (0;1) is the proportion of foreign network that a consumer can
enjoy; it depends on product market integration: ￿0 (￿) < 0. The parameter ￿ ￿ 0
measures the importance of the network size e⁄ect for consumers. Therefore, the
network bene￿t also increases with product market integration: the more markets
are integrated the more consumers of one country bene￿t from the number of con-
sumers of the other country adopting the same network good or compatible goods.
If we think again of the mobile communication services example, product market
integration reduces the roaming costs and in turn makes the network bene￿t higher.
Also, market integration makes more accessible to consumers complementary prod-
ucts, like post-purchase services.
Overall, consumer￿ s utility is increasing in product market integration.
2.1 Demands
In order to solve the model, we assume that the market is fully covered, i.e., u
is large enough so that each consumer buys one unit of either good.7 Formally,
market coverage means that n1 = n2 = n. We ￿rst analyze the decision problem of
consumers which choose between the goods maximizing their net surplus (for any
level of prices). In this maximization problem they take as given the decisions of
the other consumers.
In each country, consumer type x buys the local good l rather than the foreign
good k if and only if Ui
l (x) ￿ Ui
k (x). Solving this inequality for both countries,
we determine the indi⁄erent consumer in country 1 and 2, denoted by xC
1A and xC
2B,
6We could think of c(￿) as a learning cost which decreases with product market integration and
in turn makes higher the intrinsic bene￿t of the good.
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prefer the local good A and
in contrast consumer types x 2 (xC
1A;1] prefer the foreign good B. Similarly, in





prefer the local good B and consumer types
x 2 (xC
2B;1] prefer the foreign good A.8 We can thus ￿nd the total demands for the




























n￿ (1 + ￿ (￿)) + c(￿)
￿
:
As we can see from the expressions above, quantities are independent of the adminis-
trative costs t(￿) as they are the same in both countries. Moreover, at the same price,
p = pA = pB, both ￿rms enjoy a positive demand, in particular, qA = qB = n > 0
because of the presence of horizontal di⁄erentiation.10 We can also reasonably as-
sume that the demand for the local good increases with ￿, as a result, there will
exist an upperbound for ￿, that is the degree of product market integration at which




Let ￿l be the pro￿t of ￿rm l = fA;Bg. Both ￿rms are producing without incurring
any production cost. Then, ￿rm l￿ s maximization problem becomes: maxpl ￿l =
8As in most ￿location￿ models, goods should be su¢ ciently di⁄erentiated in or-
der to have interior equilibria. In particular, we here focus on the market cover-
age case and so we have: xC
1A and xC
2A belong to the interval [0;1] if pA ￿ pB 2
[t(￿) ￿ (￿n(1 + ￿ (￿)) + c(￿));(￿n(1 + ￿ (￿)) + c(￿)) ￿ t(￿)], which is a non-empty interval if
c(￿) > t(￿) ￿ ￿n(1 + ￿ (￿)).
9We rule out market segmentation which means that the price of each brand is the same
anywhere in the world.




l ￿ 1 , t(￿) < (￿n(1 + ￿ (￿)) + c(￿)) which means that trade occurs
as long as trade costs are su¢ ciently low.














As in a standard linear city model, the price positively depends on what we can
interpret to be the transportation cost, c(￿). However, it also depends on the
network e⁄ect. We have that @pC=@￿ ￿ 0 , c0 (￿) ￿ ￿￿n￿0 (￿):
Proposition 1 When consumers have heterogeneous preferences towards a local and
a foreign good, an increase in market integration has an ambiguous e⁄ect on prices
in presence of international network externalities. The higher (smaller) ￿ is the
more likely an increase in market integration will increase (decrease) prices.
Thus, product market integration has an ambiguous e⁄ect on equilibrium prices
due to the presence of two opposite forces: c0 (￿) > 0 and ￿0 (￿) < 0. As markets
become more separated, on the one hand, ￿rms￿market power increases so that they
can set higher prices; on the other hand, the reduction in network bene￿t induces
consumers to value less both goods, that is their willingness to pay decreases which
in turn has a negative e⁄ect on prices.
3 Concluding comments
We have shown that market integration may have an ambiguous e⁄ect on prices in
presence of international network externalities. This result depends on the assump-
tion about the compatibility between the local and foreign good. This is reasonable
if we think of mobile phones: they allow you to communicate with both consumers
adopting the same operator and consumers adopting a rival operator. However, this
result does not hold under incompatible goods. Indeed, developing the same model
as before but assuming that what matters for consumers￿choice is only the number
of users choosing the same good in both countries, it can be shown that, the price
only depends on c(￿) and the e⁄ect of ￿ is then clearly positive. Comparing com-
patible vs incompatible goods, we can make the following remarks. As far as the
equilibrium variables are concerned, the important di⁄erence is that when goods are
compatible, the network size is the same for both goods, as a result the network
6has a positive e⁄ect on their values for consumers and in turn a positive e⁄ect on
their prices, which indeed are increasing in ￿. On the other hand, when goods are
not compatible, competition is tougher because ￿rms try to conquer as many con-
sumers as possible in order to get a higher network than the rival ￿rm and in turn
more consumers which, for a given intrinsic bene￿t, value just their own network size.
As a consequence, ￿rms price their good at the lowest possible value, i.e. as if ￿ = 0.
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